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ABSTRACT 
 
Some wildlife species are agricultural pests but these populations are often valued by 
other than agriculturalists. For non-farmers, the population levels of such wildlife are 
frequently pure public goods. This is one source of market failure in the economically 
optimal social control of an agricultural pest of this type. Secondly, if the species is 
geographically mobile, externalities occur between farmers in the control of the 
species, and this reduces the incentives of farmers as individuals to control the pest 
species. It is shown that depending on the relative strength of these opposing types of 
market failure, farmers may excessively reduce or insufficiently decrease the 
population of a species from a social economic point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
In many cases, wildlife species that are agricultural pests to farmers are valued by 
non-farmers. Some have existence value for non-farmers and can sometimes be 
regarded as pure public goods from their point of view. The African buffalo is one 
species that has these joint attributes but many other wildlife species, such as elephant 
species, also do. Nevertheless, in most cases, wildlife species are mixed goods 
(Tisdell, 2009, pp. 82-83) from the point of view of non-farmers. As discussed by 
(Tisdell, 2005, section 5.2) the total economic value of many wildlife species consists 
of diverse economic components or categories of types of economic goods. For 
example, the species just mentioned apart from having passive or non-use values have 
use values both of a consumptive and non-consumptive nature. For example, a 
consumptive use value of the African buffalo is its utilization for edible dry meat 
(biltong) and the meat, tusks, hides and other parts of the elephant can be used. The 
utilization of the species for tourism, other than that involving recreational hunting, 
constitutes a use value for them. In this analysis, it will be assumed that any benefits 
obtained by non-farmers from the population of a wildlife species cannot be 
appropriated by farmers. For farmers, this benefit is an external benefit. 
Several economic questions arise in such cases. These include the following: To what 
extent is it economically optimal to reduce the population of such a species given the 
conflicting interests of farmers and non-farmers in its population? What factors are 
likely to influence decisions by individual farmers to reduce population of the species 
which occur on their property? It will be argued that decisions by farmers in this 
respect are influenced by the geographical mobility of the species and in addition, 
they fail to take into account the value placed by non-farmers on the presence of the 
species. These two types of failures (depending on circumstances to be discussed) can 
result in excessive or insufficient reduction in the population of the species by farmers 
from a social economic point of view. In turn, the factors will be considered that 
influence decisions of individual farmers to reduce agricultural wildlife pests on their 
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properties and then socially optimal decisions for reducing the populations of such 
wildlife will be examined. This analysis is followed by a discussion and conclusions.  
2. Decisions by Individual Farmers to Kill Wildlife Pests on their Property 
In deciding on whether to kill pests on their property, individual farmers will compare 
the economic gains from this action with the cost to them of killing the pest. In Figure 
1, for example, line ABC might represent the marginal benefit to a farmer of killing a 
pest on his/her property and line OBD might be the associated marginal benefit to the 
farmer. In the case shown, the farmer maximizes his own net gain by killing K1 of the 
pest population on his property. It does not pay the farmer to kill all of the pest 
animals that come to his property. 
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Figure 1: An illustration of the most economic kill of a pest by a farmer on his 
property. Only the farmer’s net benefits are considered.  
 
Note that the mobility of the pest population and the natural rate of population 
replacement will affect the level of kill that is optimal from the farmer’s point of view. 
The more rapid is the replacement of killed animals by those from other properties, 
the lower is line ABC. Therefore, the less economic is control. In general, the greater 
the geographical mobility of animals, the less economic is control from an individual 
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farmer’s point of view (Tisdell, 1982, pp. 367-372). Also this is so the faster the 
population increases after its numbers are reduced (Tisdell, 1982, pp. 372-374).  
It is also true that what is economically optimal from an individual farmer’s point of 
view as far as pest control is concerned is not necessarily optimal from the point of 
view of farmers collectively. For example, individual farmers are likely to exert 
insufficient control of a pest from the collective viewpoint of farmers if the pest is 
mobile. When the pest is mobile, other farmers obtain a favourable externality from 
its control by an individual farmer. However an individual farmer will not take this 
into account in his decision to control the pest population on his property. There is, 
therefore, insufficient control from the collective point of view of farmers. This can be 
illustrated by Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, line ABC is the private marginal gain to an individual farmer of reducing 
the population of the pest found on his property and line EFG represents the marginal 
collective benefits (benefit to all farmers only) of doing this. The difference between 
these two lines represents the external (spillover) benefits to other farmers of the 
individual farmer killing the pest population on his property. The marginal cost to the 
farmer of killing the pest is represented by line OD. Given the situation shown in 
Figure 2, the individual farmer will only kill K1 of the pest found on his/her property 
whereas it is optimal from the viewpoint of all farmers to kill K2.  
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Figure 2: Figure to show that because of external benefits to other farmers, 
individual farmers may under control a pest on their property (if the pest 
is mobile) when the collective benefits of all farmers are considered. 
 
A complex interdependence problem arises when pests are mobile. The amount by 
which a farmer finds it profitable to control a pest varies with the amount of control 
that other farmers exert. Therefore, modelling this problem is complex! However, it is 
not completely hopeless. 
3. The Socially Optimal Reduction in the Population of a Wildlife Pest 
Consider a wildlife species that causes damages to farms but is also valued by non-
farmers. For non-farmers, the level of the population of the wildlife species may be a 
pure public good. What is the socially optimal level of control of this agricultural 
pest? Figure 3 can be used to consider this issue. In this figure, X represents the level 
of population of the wildlife species and the Y-axis indicates monetary values for 
example in dollars. Relationship ACD represents the extra value placed by non-
farmers on the level of population of the focal species (for instance, the African 
buffalo) and line OE specifies the extra losses incurred by farmers as the level of 
population of the species increases. Non-farmers do not place any extra value on 
populations of the focal species in excess of X3. 
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Figure 3: An illustration of the socially optimal control of a wildlife species which 
is an agricultural pest for farmers but which is valued by non-farmers. 
 
Suppose that the focal species has a population of X4. Although farmers would like to 
see the population of the pest reduced to zero, it would only be socially optimal to 
reduce it to at most X2. A reduction to X2 would be optimal in the unlikely event that 
the level of the population of the species can be reduced at zero cost. X2 corresponds 
to point B, the point at which the marginal value of the species to non-farmers just 
equals the marginal loss that their population causes to farmers. If the marginal cost of 
killing numbers of the species or otherwise reducing its population is positive, it is 
socially optimal to reduce its population by less than X4 – X1. Furthermore, the larger 
the marginal cost of reducing the population of a species, the smaller is the socially 
optimal reduction in the level of its population. 
For example, suppose for simplicity that the marginal cost of reducing the population 
of the species is a constant equivalent to EH in Figure 3. Then line FH represents the 
net marginal benefits to the farm sector from reducing the population level of the 
species when movements from right to left in X are considered. In this case, the 
socially optimal level of the population of X corresponds to point G and reduction in 
the level of population of the species from X4 to X2 is socially optimal. 
5 
4. Discussion 
Note that if the population of the species is less than X3, (see Figure 3) non-farmers 
will be opposed to any policies that reduce its population and therefore, will be in 
conflict with farmers. Furthermore, because of the externality issues mentioned above 
farmers may, by their individual actions, reduce the population of the focal species by 
too little or by too much from a social point of view. Opposing forces come into play. 
The failure of farmers to take into account the preferences of non-farmers tends to 
lead to a socially excessive level of reduction in the population of the species by 
farmers. On the other hand, when the species is mobile between farms, this reduces 
the economic incentive of individual farmers to reduce its population. The final 
outcome depends on the relative strength of these forces. If the mobility of the species 
is low, if the costs to individual farmers of reducing populations on their properties 
are low and if the losses caused by the species are high, this is likely to result in an 
excessive economic reduction in the population of the species at the hands of farmers. 
On the other hand, if the species is highly mobile, less than a socially optimal level of 
control of its level of population is likely to be undertaken by farmers. 
It is clear that depending on the circumstances, farmers can excessively or 
inadequately reduce the population of wildlife species which are agricultural pests. 
Market failures occur of the type specified above. These failures tend to operate in 
opposite directions. On the one hand, failure of farmers to take into account the 
marginal value that non-farmers place on the population of a focal species encourages 
farmers to reduce its population by a socially excessive amount if it is an agricultural 
pest. On the other hand, the externalities that arise when the agricultural pest is mobile 
reduce the incentive of individual farmers to control its population. The net effect on 
the population of the species depends on the relative strength of those counteracting 
forces. 
Note that in the above discussion, wildlife that is killed has been assumed to have no 
market value. If it does this will reduce the net cost of killing it and in Figure 3 this 
will shift the line FGH upwards. If in fact, it is profitable to harvest it, line FG will 
rise above line OE and therefore it may become socially optimal to reduce the 
population of the wildlife species by more than X4 – X1. 
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5. Conclusion 
The above theory helps to explain why in some jurisdictions landholders are legally 
obliged to reduce wildlife agricultural pests on their properties and to refrain from 
doing this in other cases. The former seems likely when little or no value is placed on 
the wildlife species by non-farmers, as is the case of some feral animals (for example, 
feral pigs) and the species is very mobile (Tisdell, 1982). The latter seems more likely 
in cases where non-farmers value the wildlife species significantly and it is relatively 
immobile. 
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